Sixty days after taking office, Peru's new government led by Fuerza Popular is demonstrating virtual total continuity with the previous administration that governed the country from December 2022 to July 2026.
Political analyst Juan De la Puente wrote in an analysis for La República on Monday that the new administration has maintained the structural and non-democratic characteristics of the previous regime.
De la Puente noted that both the installation of the hybrid regime between 2022 and 2026 and the narrow victory of Fuerza Popular marked the end of Peruvian democracy. While the earlier period represented democracy's collapse, the election victory reiterated that ongoing decline.
Democratic forces had prepared for the possible reelection of the hybrid regime, but were unprepared for continuity to cover almost all government functions and departments.
The analyst stated that continuity was the predictable outcome of a regime that maintained power at the cost of dozens of deaths, barely avoided a total implosion, and arrived exhausted at the end of the 2026 electoral process.
Fuerza Popular, a right-wing political party led by Keiko Fujimori, won the 2026 elections after a tight second-round vote. The previous administration was led by President Dina Boluarte, who assumed office in December 2022 following the impeachment of Pedro Castillo.
Before taking power, some observers held a nuanced view that the incoming government possessed the innovation capacity to start with a clean slate while utilizing existing state structures.
The administration contributed to this narrative by claiming it was inheriting a shattered country from the previous government.
However, De la Puente emphasized that no such fresh start has occurred, as government continuity remains virtually absolute.
Although Fuerza Popular promised technocratic neoliberal shifts with varying degrees of authoritarianism during the election campaign, De la Puente indicated that innovative policy shifts are increasingly unlikely.
He warned that any authoritarian neoliberal turn would closely resemble the authoritarianism of the Boluarte administration and remain tied to that benchmark.
Executive Tone and Opposition Normalization
Until shortly before her trip to the United States for the UN General Assembly, the president took steps, whether by strategy or intuition, to reduce the expected radicalism and ferocity of the administration.
This softer stance was supported by a cabinet that demonstrated broader political representation than analysts had initially expected.
During her speech at the United Nations in New York, Keiko Fujimori specifically referred to ongoing judicial trials against military personnel.
De la Puente noted that recent presidential speeches represented a narrative shift, though translating that rhetoric into reality would require the administration to adopt a fierce continuist approach.
The reduction in expected ferocity has generated intense public debate over minor administrative details while drawing attention away from the non-democratic essence of the government.
Opposition forces have allowed themselves to be carried away by the normalization of this continuity, including both groups seeking democratic restoration and those acting as hinge parties with the Executive.
De la Puente argued that it is necessary to re-examine not only the nature of the current government but also the political role of the opposition.
Mandate for Democratization
In the first round of the 2026 presidential election, a majority of Peruvian voters cast ballots against the existing parliamentary pact.
In the second round, half of the voting population supported political movements striving to overcome the status quo of what De la Puente termed the Obscene Republic.
That status quo included captured state institutions, authoritarian constitutional rules, anti-democratic legislation, and a mercantilist economy.
The analyst stressed that voters gave the opposition a clear mandate for democratization and deliberative, honest government, rather than a mandate for continuity or minor reform.
Nine Crises Marking the First 60 Days
During its first 60 days in power, the administration faced nine distinct political junctures and crises that unfolded in rapid succession.
These events included the government's request for delegated legislative powers, proposed changes to the Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion museum (LUM), and regional protests outside Lima over rising fuel prices and transit fares.
The period was also marked by transport strike threats in Lima, security incidents in the northern coastal city of Trujillo in early September, the Shield of the Americas initiative, and the official visit of US politician Marco Rubio.
Further complications arose from controversies surrounding ad honorem advisers, the involvement of political consultant Fernando Cerimedo, the congressional interpellation of the Interior Minister, escalating violent crime, and the presidential delegation to New York.
The LUM, located in Lima, is Peru's national memorial museum documenting human rights violations and violence during the country's internal armed conflict from 1980 to 2000.
De la Puente observed that the opposition failed to articulate a cohesive response during these nine crises, despite repeatedly issuing warnings about the government's non-democratic character.
While legislative delegation and rising crime dominated opposition efforts, lawmakers missed opportunities to demand non-negotiable democratic guarantees, such as repealing pro-crime and impunity laws as a condition for granting legislative powers.
Media Alignment and the Framing Trap
The opposition has primarily engaged with the government and major allied media outlets, maintaining only a secondary connection with Peruvian civil society.
Although opposition lawmakers managed to disrupt government initiatives, they fragmented their political agenda into minor, disconnected topics rather than focusing on democratic restoration.
Major media organisations aligned with the administration have routinely labeled opposition members as obstructionists while insulting their political inexperience.
These media outlets have simultaneously ignored inexperience within the ruling party, courted potential political turncoats, and investigated conflicts of interest among parliamentarians while overlooking cabinet ministers.
A recent survey by the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP), a prominent Lima-based social research institution, showed declining public approval for Parliament.
De la Puente highlighted that Congress, which should serve as the focal point for restoring democracy based on election results, has seen its democratic agenda subordinated by media-driven distraction.
Risks of Political Mimicry and Domestication
Historical experience in Peruvian politics suggests that submitting to a rival's framing leads to political mimicry and parliamentary domestication.
Political mimicry involves opposition groups losing their distinct identity and failing to honor the electoral mandate of their voters.
Parliamentary domestication occurred between 2022 and 2026, leading to the loss of official party registration for several political organizations that compromised with ruling coalitions.
Parties affected during that period included the left-wing Perú Libre party, which allied with far-right congressional factions, as well as center parties including Alianza para el Progreso (APP), Somos Perú, Acción Popular (AP), and Partido Morado.
De la Puente concluded that the opposition must recover its political voice across its diverse factions to initiate democratic recovery and reclaim the nation's governance.
He warned that if opposition leaders fail to act, the continuity operating within the executive branch will spread to the democratic parliamentary groups that promised to restore democracy.
Related Commentary by Juan De la Puente
In previous columns for La República, De la Puente examined the electoral and political trajectory leading up to the 2026 administration.
Writing on July 26, 2026, De la Puente argued that governance could not succeed while retaining pro-crime laws, pursuing hardline security policies without police reform, and governing exclusively from Lima while ignoring regional territories.
On June 28, 2026, he warned against extending the hybrid regime through a Lima-centric oligarchic government, calling instead for a democratic agreement within parliament.
His earlier commentary during the 2026 election campaign on May 23 and May 17 emphasized the challenges faced by voters under intense pressure and analyzed democratic voting options ahead of the decisive electoral rounds.
