Ernesto Álvarez, Peru's Minister of Justice, has sparked widespread condemnation from criminal defence lawyers after linking the country's Code of Criminal Procedure to organised crime during an address to the Constitution Commission of the Congress of the Republic. The minister told lawmakers that the code was created by litigating lawyers who designed the legal framework solely to benefit their clients.
Álvarez escalated his criticism before the congressional committee by contending that certain defence attorneys are active members of the criminal gangs they represent in court. The remarks provoked an immediate reaction across Peru's legal community, with prominent defence attorneys describing his claims as factually erroneous and dangerous for the administration of justice.
The dissatisfaction quickly played out across social media platforms, where defence lawyers Humberto Abanto, César Nakazaki, Julio Espinoza Goyena, and Carlos Rivera Paz issued detailed refutations. All four lawyers united around a central fact: the 2004 Code of Criminal Procedure was not drafted exclusively by private litigators, but involved judges, prosecutors, and public officials.
In Peru, the Code of Criminal Procedure governs the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of criminal offences. Enacted in 2004 to replace older inquisitorial practices, the accusatory system was designed to establish clear boundaries between investigative bodies and judicial decision-makers while protecting constitutional due process rights for defendants.
Exchange Between Minister and Defence Counsel
Defence attorney Humberto Abanto delivered one of the sharpest responses to the justice minister. Abanto wrote on social media that it was astonishing for the minister to demonstrate such unfamiliarity with fundamental due process principles, emphasizing that democratic states deliberately make convictions rigorous in order to minimize the risk of a judicial error.
Abanto concluded his public statement by remarking that the minister had squandered an exceptional opportunity to remain silent.
Álvarez swiftly issued a public counter-response to Abanto. The minister stated that Abanto's message illustrated how difficult it was to summarize the entire crisis of the justice system within a brief two-to-three-minute presentation.
The justice minister further asserted that the Code of Criminal Procedure had failed in its essential purpose. Álvarez contended that defending the procedural framework, as Abanto had done, merely proved that the code serves the attorneys of criminals rather than citizens who fall victim to crime, turning a technical discussion into a sharp personal confrontation between the two men.
Institutional Drafting and Procedural Protections
Julio Espinoza Goyena presented evidence regarding the institutional origins of the legal framework. Espinoza Goyena explained that he had served as Technical Secretary of the High-Level Commission that drafted the 2004 Code of Criminal Procedure, a body comprising more than 12 members, including judges, prosecutors, and police officers. Representatives from the Bar Association accounted for only two seats on the commission.
Espinoza Goyena highlighted specific articles within the code that contradict the minister's claims. He noted that statutory provisions governing identity verification checks, video surveillance, investigative searches, and bodily interventions provide law enforcement with robust statutory mechanisms to strengthen criminal prosecutions, making it a grave error to claim the model was crafted to favor organised crime.
Statutory provisions for identity checks allow police officers to verify credentials during active investigations, while regulated video surveillance and bodily interventions permit targeted forensic procedures under strict judicial oversight to ensure evidence remains admissible in court.
Authorship and Causes of Judicial Failure
Criminal defence lawyer César Nakazaki focused his response on the primary authorship of the procedural code. Nakazaki pointed out that the principal drafter of the code was César San Martín Castro, a career magistrate by training rather than a private litigator.
Nakazaki warned against conflating procedural safeguards with the underlying problems plaguing the criminal justice system. He explained that operational failures stem from investigative shortcomings, a lack of technology, corruption, or legal incompetence rather than statutory protections guaranteed to the accused.
Magistrate César San Martín Castro is a senior judicial figure in Peru who has presided over high-profile trials in the Supreme Court, representing the career judiciary that shaped the 2004 procedural reform.
Trial Timelines and Due Process Guarantees
Abanto also offered a detailed procedural correction regarding trial delays, addressing an example raised by the minister. Abanto explained that the submission of new evidence takes place at the start of oral trial proceedings, whereas requests for exceptional evidence occur at the conclusion.
Both evidentiary requests are argued within the same hearing rather than requiring an additional session as Álvarez had suggested. Abanto stressed that it is extremely rare for evidence to surface after an investigation closes, because accused individuals must be informed of all material evidence to exercise their constitutional right to a defence.
Carlos Rivera Paz of the Legal Defence Institute took a direct approach in his critique. In two separate publications, Rivera Paz stated that the minister has no understanding of the subject and described Álvarez's rhetoric as repugnant.
Rivera Paz contended that the minister's underlying objective is clear: to weaken due process protections by propagating a narrative that falsely frames the criminal code as an instrument built to aid lawbreakers.
The Legal Defence Institute, known locally as IDL, is a Peruvian non-governmental organisation focused on constitutional rights, anti-corruption efforts, and judicial administration reform.
Calls for Fact-Based Reform Debate
The collective pushback from legal practitioners underscores a shared demand across Peru's legal sector. Defence attorneys insist that any serious debate regarding criminal procedural reform must be supported by empirical data rather than broad generalizations.
The public exchange between Álvarez and Abanto, combined with the technical refutations from Nakazaki, Espinoza Goyena, and Rivera Paz, highlights a growing divide between the Ministry of Justice and Peru's criminal defence establishment as discussions over legal reform continue in Congress.
