Ukrainian: A crisis with ‘roots’ of 14 years – How Putin’s threats are being dealt with now

By Michael Krepon

The current crisis in Ukraine has two main driving forces. The first is Putin’s fundamental beliefs. The second is the decision of former President George W. Bush to pursue NATO enlargement by breaking Putin’s “red lines” to include Ukraine and Georgia.

Putin is nourished, on the one hand, by his personal need to remain omnipotent and, on the other, by a sense of grievance, which has its roots in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Nothing signals Russia more shrinking than NATO enlarging it to include three former members of the Warsaw Pact and – at the same time – former Soviet republics: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Bush won re-election in 2004 as “wartime president,” with “freedom” dominating his campaign agenda: the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the one hand and the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance on the other. During his second term in office, Bush made the fatal decision to put Ukraine and Georgia in line to join NATO. The then US ambassador to Russia, William Burns – now CIA director – sent a personal telegram to his political boss, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, warning her that this would have disastrous consequences.

There were others who warned publicly about the issue: such as George Kennan, who proved to be right at the beginning of the Cold War about limiting Soviet power and the conditions would lead to the collapse of the USSR. But Bush was determined to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. Rice spoke of the pros and cons of this development, instead of expressing strong reservations, and then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates did not externalize his view, succumbing to the highest priorities of the time. Those ministers, as well as Secretary of State Colin Powell during Bush’s first term, knew that when the president was convinced of the correctness and fairness of a decision, the counter-arguments were completely powerless.

In 2007, the Bush administration began to make clear signs of its intention to include Georgia and Ukraine in NATO. In the same year, during a speech at the Munich Security Conference, Putin accused Bush of “hostile intentions” and hinted that the days of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (INF) – which banned “missiles” and which was signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev two decades ago – were measured.

The following year, NATO formally agreed to allow Georgia and Ukraine to join the Alliance, despite strong reservations from Berlin and Paris, and Moscow began test-launching a Cruz-type surface-to-air missile, despite being banned from doing so. . In 2008, through Russian-backed “autonomous” enclaves in Georgian territory, Putin seized – and then took advantage of – the opportunity to send troops to Georgia and advance on Tbilisi. After that, Georgia would not join NATO.

In 2014, after the uprising in Ukraine succeeded in ousting a corrupt pro-government government in Moscow, Putin took action to occupy part of eastern Ukraine and annex Crimea. Burns and Kennan proved to be prophetic.

Lately, Putin has shifted his goals. He now wants Ukraine’s pro-Western leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, to abandon Ukraine’s path to NATO membership. It also wants the West to cut off military and financial aid to Kiev. Putin intends to support his demands by bringing – an estimated – 170,000 troops to the “threshold” of Ukraine. About as many troops were used by George W. Bush in 2003 to invade Iraq.

Bush’s proposal for Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO was a costly mistake – but whatever happened, it happened. NATO will not withdraw its invitation, nor will it go ahead and is willing to fight to include Ukraine in its ranks. At the moment, the cost of Putin’s decision to further cripple Ukraine’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity must be precisely determined.

Ukraine is a pro-Western state that deserves diplomatic, economic and military support. But it is not a NATO ally, so American troops are obliged to defend it. There are many options that Washington can follow in order for the cost to Moscow of a new attack to outweigh the benefits, but Joe Biden can not deter Putin if the Russian president has as a priority to curb Western influence. in Ukraine and claim other Ukrainian territories, moves he believes will increase his power.

Reaching the 30 member states, NATO has lost its identity, but also its institutional cohesion. Whether the Alliance can regain and maintain its cohesion if Putin decides to attack Ukraine again remains an open question. If, however, Putin has not yet made the final decision to wage another war on Ukrainian soil, Washington and other NATO powers must clarify the consequences to the Kremlin of such a move, accelerating the steps already under way.

Kiev does not need to join NATO to deepen its economic ties with Europe, nor to receive allied assistance to punish Russian military adventurism. Russian threats have already strengthened Washington’s immediate military support for Kiev – and will intensify even more if Putin gives the “green light” to a conflict. In addition, Ukraine borders four NATO countries through which covert military assistance can be provided.

All of these parameters, combined with the prospect of imposing financial sanctions, could have prevented Putin from making a huge mistake. We will find out what will happen very soon.

Read also:

* What does Russia’s “ultimatum” to the West mean?

* Russia’s threat to invade Ukraine and the attitude of the EU