Russia will face challenges in securing occupied territories in Ukraine

By Vikram Mittal

During their initial invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces failed to break through the resilient Ukrainian defenses. Although the Russians have regrouped and seized parts of the Donbass in southeastern Ukraine, the tide of war has not necessarily turned in the Russians’ favor. While Russia faces a fierce Ukrainian counteroffensive, the Russian military’s biggest challenge will likely be securing the areas it has captured, which the military refers to as stability operations.

These stability operations are already underway in Russian-held areas in Ukraine. The Kremlin has said it expects to hold a “referendum” in these regions on whether to join Russia on September 11. Meanwhile, Ukrainian rebels in these occupied territories are resisting the occupation, including destroying Russian buildings in Melitopol and Mariupol. The Russian military is actively involved in stability operations to rally support for the referendum and suppress Ukrainian rebels. Given the nature of the Russian military, it will likely fail in these operations.

Basically, the Russian military is not configured to perform stability operations. The main component of the Russian military structure is the Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), which consist of approximately 800 soldiers, 10 tanks, 40 infantry fighting vehicles and a large amount of artillery. These units rely heavily on their tanks and artillery units, which can deliver heavy bombardments at fairly long ranges. The Russian military is currently assembling new BTGs from volunteers, conscripts and the “remnants” of old BTGs. While some of these units are intended to fight the Ukrainian army, many are also intended for the occupied territories to carry out stability operations.

One of the complexities of stability operations is that they involve urban combat, which usually requires infantry soldiers. Less than a quarter of the soldiers in a BTG are infantry. To overcome this problem, the Russian military relies on paramilitary units to augment infantry soldiers. However, these units are quite disorganized and poorly equipped. In addition, recent evidence suggests that some of these paramilitary units may be at odds with the Kremlin.

Another issue is that the Russian military overuses artillery, even in stability operations. Artillery, especially older equipment, is not necessarily accurate and is likely to hit civilian targets in crowded urban areas. This in turn can destroy critical infrastructure and increase the hostility of the local population, thus reducing the security of the area.

With these restrictions, the Russian military, especially in conjunction with paramilitary groups, uses fear and intimidation to subjugate local populations. In Syria, the Russian military has indiscriminately hit both civilian and military targets in order to intimidate anyone into not opposing them. In Georgia and Crimea, Russian occupation forces denied people basic services unless they renounced their original citizenship and obtained Russian passports. It appears that the Russians are following similar tactics in the parts of Ukraine they hold.

These techniques usually do not perform well in the Russian military. For example, during the ten-year occupation of Afghanistan, the then-Soviet army lost 15,000 soldiers, compared to 2,500 American deaths in twenty years. In their most recent operations in Syria, Chechnya and Georgia, stability operations have led to humanitarian issues, refugee crises and international reprimands. Moreover, in neither case did the Russians achieve the desired end state.

Occupied Ukrainian territories will likely be more difficult for the Russians to control than Syria, Chechnya or Georgia. A survey found that 77% of Ukrainians living in Russian-controlled areas do not support the occupation. Another survey done before the war showed that a large part of Ukrainians, including those who have Russian nationality, were willing to take up arms against the Russian invaders. These Ukrainian rebels will have access to advanced weapons supplied by the Ukrainian military and the international community. Given the geography of the region, it would be a challenge for the Russians to stop this flow of equipment. In addition, the Ukrainians have proven to be technologically savvy, harnessing commercial technology for military purposes.

Meanwhile, the Russian military has exhausted its resources – both in personnel and equipment – for the invasion of Ukraine. Recent moves to mobilize its defense industrial base and create “volunteer” units will alleviate some of these issues. However, many of these resources will go towards fighting the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Personnel who are to perform stability operations will likely be undertrained with little or no training in urban areas or counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the Russians will be deprived of the raw materials and resources needed to rebuild the parts of Ukraine they destroyed during the conquest. Without the restoration of basic infrastructure, they will further fuel the insurgency.

If the Ukrainian counteroffensive fails and the Russians annex parts of southeastern Ukraine, the war will not be over for Russia. As evidenced by US military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Russians will likely commit their military to remaining in the occupied parts of Ukraine for a significant period of time. Given their tactics, they will face many challenges in securing the territories and may never gain full control.